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NOTES
Imprisonment for Nonpayment of Fines and Costs: A New Look
at the Law and the Constitution
"We ought always to deal justly, not only with those who arejust
to us, but likewise to those who endeavor to injure us; and this for
fear lest by rendering them evil for evil, we should fall into the
same vice."

Hierocles
I.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this note is to evaluate the long-accepted use of
imprisonment in default of payment of fines and costs assessed upon a
guilty defendant during the post-conviction sentencing process.'
Despite the resurgence of concern in America today to preserve
procedural fairness and equality in all criminal proceedings, the
sentencing process remains practically unsupervised by legislative,
judicial or constitutional controls. Indeed, society's interest in the
accused virtually disappears after conviction, and the safeguards
designed to insure fairness and equality are replaced by the almost
complete discretion of the sentencing judge and the correctional
authorities. This arbitrary power to determine the complex questions
of sentencing implements the current desire for individualized
punishment-adapting the sentence to the offender rather than solely
to the offense-and sentencing discretion exercised to reflect this policy
is certainly justifiable and desirable. However, this society was
established upon principles of human value, and upon each
individual's inherent right to certain basic freedoms such as equal
justice under law, and sentencing discretion exercised in disregard of
sound sentencing policy is not otherwise immune from challenge.
This note is based on the premise that a new understanding of the
principles of sentencing has evolved during the past half-century. After
articulating this thesis, one which has been more fully developed
elsewhere,2 an assessment is made of the extent to which the more
1. Since the vast majority of defendants plead guilty, the sentencing process is the only
significant confrontation with the judicial process for most offenders. See THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT:

THE COURTS 9 (1967).
2. For discussions of sentencing discretion and suggested reform, see Chandler, Latter-Day
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modern concepts of sentencing have been embodied in public policy as
enunciated in statutes and court decisions, particularly decisions
interpreting constitutional requirements. This examination reveals that
the existing rules and practices concerning imprisonment for fines and
costs reflect uneasy compromises between competing policies and that
these rules and practices are largely holdovers from an earlier time
when both courts and legislatures proceeded on principles of
sentencing quite different from those advocated by most contemporary
penologists. A scattering of statutes and decisions, however, indicate
that significant changes are beginning to take place, changes
consistent with contemporary sentencing theory. Perhaps more
important, it is submitted that developments in other areas of
criminal procedure indicate that modern sentencing theory has an
arguably important role in the extension of constitutional protections.
The note concludes that the operative rules concerning imprisonment
for fines and costs should be changed to reflect present day
understanding of sentencing theory, that certain of these changes can
be premised on constitutional mandates, and that others should be
embodied in emendations of statutes and of the common law.
II.

LEGISLATIVE STANDARDS

A.

AND SENTENCING POLICY

Goals of Criminal Correction

The ultimate objective of all criminal laws is the protection of
society, and this is as true of the sentencing of offenders as it is of the
definition of specific offenses. Traditionally, punishment was meant
to secure retribution for the evil done by the offender,4 and the
objective of sentencing was to make the punishment fit the crime, that
is, to provide equivalent sentences for similar offenses. Severe
penalties were widely known, and death was imposed routinely for
even the most trivial of crimes. An offender was sentenced according
to the sanction prescribed by law; any reduction of his sentence was
from mercy rather than by right. The theory of retribution has long
Procedures in the Sentencing and Treatment of Offenders in the Federal Courts, 37 VA. L. REV.
825 (1951); Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75
HARV. L. REV. 904 (1962); Note, Procedural Due Process at JudicialSentencing for Felony, 81
HARV. L. REV. 821 (1968); Note, Due Process and Legislative Standardsin Sentencing, 101 U.
PA. L. REV. 257 (1952).

3. "Penal administration shall be based on the principles of reformation and upon the
need for protecting the public." ALASKA CONST. art. 1,§ 12. See Weber v. Commonwealth, 303
Ky. 56, 196 S.W.2d 465 (1946); State v. Meyer, 163 Ohio St. 279, 126 N.E.2d 585 (1955).

4. So notes 13-15 infra and accompanying text.
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been repudiated, however, and reformation and rehabilitation are
today the important goals of criminal correction In modern penal
theory, mitigating circumstances of individual personality or capacity
make the signficance of one criminal act different from another of the
same class. The appropriate sentence can be determined only after a
broad range of information about the offender is evaluated
Two basic policies underlie the goals of modern sentencing
procedure: (1) a preference for treatment in the community, as
opposed to institutional treatment, where it is feasible without
detriment to the community or the prisoner;7 and (2) an emphasis on
individualization of treatment based on consideration of individual
characteristics, circumstances, needs and potentialities as revealed by
a case study of the offender.
[E]ach individual case requires on the one hand consideration of all factors
bearing upon the security and welfare of the public and, on the other, a fair
analysis and appraisal of the individual defendant. An imbalance between
compassion for the individual and concern for the public, or an unrealistic
appraisal of either, may result in a sentence unjust and harmful to the individual,
to the public, or both

Thus, the decision to impose a financial penalty represents a
conclusion that this sanction is the appropriate method of treating the
offender; any different treatment would be less useful as a penal
sanction and more harmful to the person on whom it is imposed., A
corollary to the goal of individualization of punishment is that a
defendant should not be assessed a financial penalty beyond his ability
to pay.' 0 Rather, the financial resources of the defendant and the
nature of the burden that its payment will impose, are important
factors in determining the amount and method of payment for each
particular offender." These principles form the fundamental
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949); S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL
645-72 (1963); Boldt, Recent Trends in Criminal Sentencing, 27 FED. PROB. 3
(March, 1963).
6. See NAT'L PROBATION AND PAROLE Ass'n, Standard Probation and Parole Act
§ I (1955). See generally S. RUBIN, supra note 5, at 645-94; E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY,
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 335-85 (7th ed. 1966); Note, 81 HARV. L. REV., supra note 2, at
823.
7. For example, consider the recent development of probation, parole, suspended
sentences, and work release. For the criteria under which a term of imprisonment would be an
appropriate sanction, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01 (1962).
5.

CORRECTION

8.

Boldt, supra note 5, at 3.

9. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.02(l)(2)(b) (1962), § 7:02, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1954).
10. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.02(3) (1962), § 7.02, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
II. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.02(4) (1962). In United States v. Doe, 101 F. Supp. 609 (D.
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perspective for the recommended changes of legislative, judicial, and
constitutional policies presented in the following analysis.
B.

The Statutory Framework

1. Fines.-(a) Background.-Although statistics are not readily

available, it is estimated that fines constitute more than 75 per cent of
all sentences imposed in the United States. 12 The origin of the fine
may be traced to the ancient practice of the payment of compensation
by a person causing the death or injury of another.13 It is based on a
strict concept of punishment originating in situations where vengence
and material reimbursement were of prime importance. When an
individual was injured by another, he was entitled to personal
retribution, and the early law required the payment of a stipulated
sum by the aggressor to the victim, the amount depending on the
injury done and the social position of the injured party." The criminal
law of fines- evolved from this process of publicly-sanctioned private
retribution when the state assumed responsibility for the punishment
of wrongdoers. The state began to demand a part of the retribution
payments, or an additional sum, as its share for participation in the
trial and as compensation for the disturbance of the peace.
Gradually, the victim's share decreased until the state received the
entire payment. These payments became a substantial source of
revenue, and imprisonment began to be used as a means of compelling
the defendant to pay the fine.'5
Under present statutes, the fine is used as a criminal sanction in
three ways: (1) imposition of a fine only-the case in most
misdemeanors where the criminal sanction is expressed in terms of a
Conn. 195 1), Chief Judge Hincks noted: "In my view, a fine known to be beyond the defendant's
capacity to pay is not in accordance with sound sentencing policy. Like any judicial order which

is not enforced, it breeds disrespect for the judicial process. It tends to encourage lack of executive
diligence in the collection of fines which with due diligence are collectible. If accompanied by

a sentence of confinement it constitutes an arbitrary obstruction of parole and creates undesirable
custodial problems. By obstructing economic rehabilitation in the long run it operates to foment
rather than to deter crime." Id. at 613 n.6.
12. S. RUBIN, supra note 5, at 240; E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSY, supra note 6, at 329.
13. The history of fines is traced in S. RUBIN, supra note 5, at 222; E. SUTHERLAND & D.
CRESSEY, supra note 6, at 328-29. See also 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
43-44, 46 (3d ed. 1923); 1 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 57 (1883);
Miller, The Fine-Price Tag or Rehabilitative Force, 2 NAT'L PROBATION & PAROLE Ass'N
J. 337 (1956).
14. For an example of early English law, see F. MAITLAND & F. MONTAGUE, A SKETCH
OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 193-99 (1915), in S. RUBIN, supra note 5, at 43-48.
15. E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY, supra note 6, at 329.
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monetary penalty; (2) imposition of a fine or imprisonment-the
alternative sentence where the criminal sanction is either confinement

or an equivilant sanction expressed in monetary terms; and, (3)
imposition of imprisonment and fine-sanction of confinement plus
forfeiture of money. The retributive aspect of the financial penalty
remains a principal reason for its use; its value as a deterrent is
probably limited to situations where greed was a primary motive for
committing the offense, or where the offender is known consciously to
consider the penalty as an obvious consequence of his decision to

violate the law, fines for breach of a no-strike clause or violations of
the Federal Communications Act, for example; a fine has insignificant

penological value when added to a term of imprisonment, or when
used as punishment for the so-called crimes of violence."6
(b) Enforcement ofpayment.- When a fine is assessed against a

convicted defendant, it becomes payable immediately. 17 One of the
accepted methods available for obtaining collection is civil action. At

common law, fines were enforced by execution against property of the
defendant,' 8 and most jurisdictions continue to provide this remedy. 9

The usual method of enforcing payment of a fine, however, has been
imprisonment.20 At common law, whenever a party was convicted of
16. See Barrett, The Role of Fines in the Administration of Criminal Justice in
Massachusetts, 48 MASS. L.Q. 435 (1963); Davidson, The Promiscuious Fine, 8 CRINI. L.Q.
74, 80-87 (1965); Note, Fines and Fining-An Evaluation, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 1013, 1020, 1023
(1952).
17. E.g., HAWAII REV. LAWS § 259-3 (1955); LA. CODE CRIM. L. & PROC. ANN. art. 888
(1968); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.400 (1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-65 (1953).
18. E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY, supra note 6, at 329.
19. ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 340 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.020 (1962); ARZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-1648 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2404 (1964); CAL. PEN. CODE § 1206;
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-10-6 (1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4101 (1953); GA. CODE
ANN. § 27-2801 (1953); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 259-5 (1955); IDAHO CODE'ANN. § 19-2518
(1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1804 (Smith-Hurd 1964); IOWA CODE ANN. § 790.1 (1950);
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1901 (1964); Ky. REV. 9TAT. ANN. § 453.020 (1963); LA. CODE
CRIM. L. & PROC. ANN. art. 886 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.48 (1947); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 95-2302 (Special Supp. 1968); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2404 (1964); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 169.070 (1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:166-11 (1953); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 470d; N.D. CENr. CODE § 29-26-22 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2949.09 (Baldwin 1964);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 137.180 (1967); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-573 (1962); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC.
art. 43.07 (1966); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-16 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-339 (1967);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.82.010 (1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-4-11 (1961); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 959.055 (1961).
20. The use of default imprisonment is especially significant in the criminal law. The
Census Bureau has estimated that 58% of all prison commitments in 1910 were for nonpayment
of fines and in 1923 the figure was 47.5%. S. RUBIN, supra note 5, at 252. A study at the
Philadelphia Reed Street Prison indicated that about 60% of the commitments were for
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an offense and sentenced to pay a fine, the court could order his
imprisonment until the fine was paid. I Unless commitment on default
of payment had been expressed as a part of the sentence, however, the

payment could be enforced only by execution against the defendant's

property.2 The practice of commitment has been continued by federal23

and state statutes, either as a mandatory part of the sentence,2 4 or as
permissive in the discretion of the court.?
In most states, the offender is compelled to discharge the fine by

serving a term of imprisonment, the duration of which is computed
according to a statutory conversion ratio equating a certain number

or fraction of dollars with a day's imprisonment2 6 Most of these
nonpayment of fines. Note, 101 U. PA. L. REV., supra note 16, at 1022. In New York City in
1960 alone, a record $15 million in fines was imposed, with 26,176 committed for nonpayment.
S. RUBIN, supra note 5, at 253.
21. The practice originated in twelfth century England. E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY,
supra note 6, at 329. See Ex parte Johnson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877); Ex parte Watkins, 32 U.S. (7
Pet.) 586 (1833); United States v. Ridgewood Garment Co., 44 F. Supp. 435 (E.D.N.Y. 1942).
The authority to commit did not usually extend to a magistrate. Mullen v. State ex rel.
Williams, 38 Del. 533, 194 A. 578 (1937); People v. Stock, 26 App. Div. 564, 50 N.Y.S. 483
(1898). But see Exparte Garrison, 193 Cal. 37, 223 P. 64 (1924).
22. Hill v. United States ex rel. Wampler, 298 U.S. 460 (1936); United States v.
Buchanan, 195 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Ky. 1961); United States v. Ridgewood Garment Co., 44 F.
Supp. 435 (E.D.N.Y. 1942). Contra, Baucum v. New Jersey Parole Bd., 68 N.J. Super. 271,
172 A.2d 231 (1961).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 3565 (1964).
24. ALA. CODE tit. 15, §§ 341-42 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.010 (1962); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 43-2315 (1964); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4103 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.14
(Supp. 1969); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2222 (1956); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1513 (1949); LA.
CODE CRIM. L. & PROC. ANN. art. 884 (1968); MISS. CODE ANN. § 2540 (1942); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 95-2302 (Special Supp. 1968); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2405 (1964); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 41-13-4 (1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-65 (1953); ORE. REV. STAT. § 137.150 (1967);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-3203 (1955); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7172 (1959); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 10.70.010 (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 959.055 (Supp. 1968).
25. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1648 (1956); CAL. PEN. CODE § 1205; COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 39-10-10 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 18-63 (1968); GA. CODE ANN. § 272901 (1953); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 259-3 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-3922 (1948); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1-7 (Smith-Hurd 1964); IOWA CODE ANN. § 762.32 (1950); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1703 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 24, § 7 (1966); MIcH. STAT. ANN.
§ 28.1077 (1954); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.160 (1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607:15 (1955);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:166-14 (1953); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-26-21 (1960); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-35-15 (1953); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-4-9 (1966); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8 (1957).
26. ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 341 (1958) ($2 to $4 per day); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.010 (1962)
($5 to SI0 per day); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1648, 31-145 (1956) ($1 per day); ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 46-510, 43-2315 (1964) ($1 per day); CAL. PEN. CODE § 1205 (S5 per day);
CONN. GEN. STAT. REV, § 18-13 (1968) ($3 per-day); FLA. STAT. ANN, §§ 951.15-.16 (Supp.
1969) ($0.30 per day); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 259-4 (Supp. 1965) ($5 per day);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2517 (Supp. 1967) ($5 per day); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1-7 (SmithHurd Supp. 1967) (S5 per day); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2227a (Supp. 1968) ($5 per
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statutory rates are arbitrary and generally have escaped
modernization or reviewP7 In some jurisdictions, imprisonment is
credited to reduce the amount of the unpaid fine only if the sentence
provides for manual labor and the prisoner actually works.!8 In other
states, mere imprisonment without labor is satisfactory under the
statute to discharge the amount of the fine. 29 In a few states,
"default" imprisonment does not substitute for liability for the
amount of the fine at all, and a civil remedy still may be pursued?0
2. Costs.-Studies of the assessment of costs in criminal
proceedings are conspicuously absent from legal literature. The only
extended work on the subject is a treatise published in 1768 and
confined to British usage?' Unlike imprisonment for nonpayment of
fines, default imprisonment for nonpayment of court costs was
unknown at common law, and in the absence of statute, a court
day); IOWA CODE ANN. § 789.17 (1962) (S3.33 per day); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-2109
(1964) ($2 per day); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 431.140-.150 (1963) ($2 per day); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 1904 (1964) ($5 per day); MD. ANN. CODE art. 38, § 4 (1966) ($1 per day);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 127, § 144 (1965) ($1 per day); MINN. STAT. § 641.10 (1961) ($3
per day); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 543.270 (1953) ($2 to $10 per day); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 95-2302 (Special Supp. 1968) ($10 per day); NEB. REV. SrA. § 29-2412 (1964) ($6 per day);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.160 (1967) ($4 per day); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607:16 (Supp. 1967)
($5 per day); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:166-16 (Supp. 1967) ($5 per day); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 422-9 (Supp. 1967) ($5 per day); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-26-21 (1960) ($2 per day); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2947.14 (Baldwin 1964) ($3 per day); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 20 (1950) ($1
per day); ORE. REV. STAT. § 137.150 (1967) ($5 per day); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15 (1953)
($2 per day); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 7221-23 (Supp. 1968) ($1 per day); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 53-221 (1967) ($0.75 per day); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.82.030 (Supp. 1967) ($10 per
day); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 624-10 (1966) ($1.50 per day); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-8 (1957) ($1
per day).
27. Pennsylvania law provides an amusing illustrative example, originally enacted in
1751: "If any person or persons whatsoever shall give or sell any rum, wine, or other strong
liquors, at the time of any vendue, to any person or persons attending the same, he, she, or they
so selling or giving any liquors, shall forfeit and pay for the first offense, the suat offour pounds,.
and for the second and every other offense, the sum.of five pounds." PENN. STAT. ANN.
tit. 47, § 665 (1952) (emphasis added).
28. People v. Hedenberg, 21 Ill. App. 2d 504, 158 N.E.2d 417 (1959); State ex rel
Mathews v. Stephenson, 112 W. Va. 218, 164 S.E. 38 (1932).
29. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 341 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.010 (1962); CONN. GEN.
STAT. REV. § 18-63 (1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 951.16 (Supp. 1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20624 (Supp. 1967); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 441.190 (1963); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 20
(1950); ORE. REV. STAT. § 137.150 (1967); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.82.030 (Supp. 1967);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-4-10 (1966).
30. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2602 (1964); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-26-21 (1960).
31. S. SAYER, THE LAW OF COSTS (1768). This work was generally restricted to civil
costs. Articles have been published dealing with costs in criminal practice in the states of
Missouri, Tennessee, and Wyoming. See Note, Criminal Costs Assessment in
Missouri- Without Rhyme or Reason, 1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 77; Note, Jail Fees and Court Costs
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cannot assess a defendant with the costs of his prosecution. 3 An
obvious corollary is that only those costs specifically enumerated by
statute are assessable. Many courts have interpreted costs to exclude
general expenses of maintaining a system of courts and administration

of justice. 4 Further, if several defendants are tried together, or if one
defendant is tried on several counts, the costs are apportioned
according to the amount attributable to each defendant, or to each

count (in the event the defendant is acquitted on some counts), to
35
avoid muftiple assessment of costs

Collection of the costs of prosecution is also governed strictly by
the statute. Most states provide a civil remedy-the costs become a
lien on the property of the defendant, against which execution may
lie.36 Some states prohibit imprisonment for nonpayment of costs if
the defendant is sentenced to the state penitentiary 7 Others prohibit

imprisonment if the defendant is unable to pay. 38 Most statutes
however require the defendant to work at hard labor, 31 or discharge
for Indigent Criminal Defendants: An Examination of the Tennessee Procedure, 35 TENN. L.
REV. 74 (1967); Note, The Assessment and Collection of the Costs of a Criminal Prosecution in
Wyoming, 13 Wyo. L.J. 178 (1959).
32. Saunders v. People, 63 Colo. 241, 165 P. 78 (1922); State v. Reed, 65 Mont. 51, 210
P. 756 (1922); State v. McO'Blenis, 21 Mo. 272 (1855); Ex parte Autry, 58 Okla. Cr. 89, 50
P.2d 239 (1935); State ex rel. Titus v. Hayes, 150 W. Va. 151, 144 S.E.2d 502 (1965); State v,
Faulkner, 75 Wyo. 104, 292 P.2d 1045 (1956). Arizona, California, and New York make no
provision for taxation of costs.
33. State v. White, 217 Tenn. 524, 398 S.W.2d 737 (1965) (litigation tax); Knox County
v. Fox, 107 Tenn. 724, 65 S.W. 404 (1901) (costs incurred after conviction); Anglea v. State, 51
Va. (10 Gratt.) 696 (1853) (costs incurred in felony case).
34. Gleckman v. United States, 80 F.2d 394 (8th Cir.), cert. denied. 297 U.S. 709 (1935);
United States v. Murphy, 59 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1932); United States v. Wilson, 193 F. 1007
(S.D.N.Y. 1911); State v. Gillman, 202 Iowa 428, 210 N.W. 318 (1885); Arnold v. State, 76
Vyo. 445, 306 P.2d 368 (1957).
35. See, e.g., State v. Faulkner, 75 Wyo. 104, 292 P.2d 1045 (1956). Several state statutes
provide for apportionment of court costs. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2949.19 (1964);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-3326 (1955).
36. See statutes cited note 19 supra.
37. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:166-4 (1953); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-20-8 (1956); TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1018 (1966); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7177 (1958). Connecticut
and Massachusetts prohibit the assessment of the costs of prosecution against all convicted
persons. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 54-143 (1949); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 280, § 6 (1968).
38. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-2404, -2405 (1964); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-2-1, 3910-9 (1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4103 (1966 Supp.); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 939.05 (1944);
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2804 (1953); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 180-6 (Smith-Hurd 1964); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 337.12 (Supp. 1968); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 62-1515, 62-1901 (1964); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:106-7 (1953); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2949.19 (Baldwin 1964); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 959.055 (Supp. 1968).
39. ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 341 (1958); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-145 (1956); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 46-502 (1964); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 259-3 (1955); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-
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the costs by imprisonment according to a statutory rate of
conversion
3. Discharge from imprisonment.-Obviously, if the prisoner
pays the amount of the fine or costs due, he becomes entitled to
discharge from imprisonment, although this occasion is difficult to
imagine, since anyone with enough money initially to pay the
assessment would rarely be confined in jail. In addition to this method
of discharge, many statutes recognize the hardship which the default
imprisonment statutes work on an indigent defendant, and permit an
indigent prisoner to secure his release without having paid the fine or
costs!,
A few states limit the period of confinement to be maximum
imprisonment to which the defendant could have been sentenced
as punishment for the crime he committed 2 Other jurisdictions excuse
a defendant from the payment of costs whenever he is sentenced to a
term of imprisonment, assessing costs to the county of the place of
the trial 3 Discharge on proof of insolvency is allowed by the federal
government4 4 and by many states?5 The typical requirements for an
insolvency discharge include a sworn statement that the prisoner does
not own a certain minimum amount of property. If he qualifies, the
prisoner may be released from imprisonment after a fixed period of
confinement.
The use of an insolvency oath has several
disadvantages. First, it does not entitle the prisoner to be discharged
until a fixed period of confinement has expired. Where the prisoner
was convicted on several counts, this initial period can be of significant
2239 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.140 (1963); MINN. STAT. § 641.10 (1961); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 221.180 (1962); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2404 (1964); TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-2119
(1955); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 43.10 (1966); VA. CODE ANN. § 53-221 (1967); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 10.82.040 (Supp. 1967); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-282 (1957).
40. See statutes cited note 26 supra.
41. See statutes cited note 38 supra.
42. ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1648 (1956); CAL. PEN. CODE § 1205; N.Y. CODE
CRIM. PROC. § 470-d.
43. See statutes cited note 37 supra.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 3569 (1964).
45. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.030 (1962); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 259-3 (1955); KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1515 (1949); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 127, § 146 (1965); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 546.850 (1953); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-2-9 (Supp. 1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 23-24
(1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 15 (1950); ORE. REV. STAT. § 169.160 (1967); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 61, § 377 (1964); S.D. CODE § 13.4614 (1960); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-334 (1967).
46. Some statutes require waiting periods of up to six months. See
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 15 (1950); S.D. CODE § 13.4614 (1960). But see Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 221.180 (1962).
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Second, the statutory property amount is totally unrelated to

the amount of the fine or costs and is an unreliable estimate of a
person's economic status and, specifically, his ability to pay the

assessments. Finally, the taking of an insolvency oath usually entitles
the prisoner only to a hearing of his cause, at which time the
determination of his release may be made; actual discharge may be

delayed even further.
C.

The Purposeof Imprisonment

From a defendant's point of view, imprisonment for default is
indistinguishable from an ordinary sentence of imprisonment. Both
are equally stigmatizing and incapacitating to the prisoner, and both

subject him to all the evils of short-term imprisonment. 8
Penologically, however, the purpose for which each is imposed differs
significantly.
Most authorities agree that commitment for nonpayment of a
fine does not represent punishment for the substantive criminal
offense, but is essentially a means of enforcing the judgment of the
court; it is a supplement to the state's civil remedy of levy and
execution.49 Implicit in this concept is the idea that imprisonment is
less desirable from the defendant's point of view than is a fine;
otherwise the threat of default imprisonment would have no coercive
effect. On the other hand, the position which regards imprisonment on

default of a fine to be punishment equates the severity of the fine and
the applicable period of imprisonment, and assumes that on default of
47. Sentences for default imprisonment may run consecutively and the minimum term has
been interpreted to apply to each individual count. See. e.g., Wright v. Matthews, 209 Va. 246,
163 S.E.2d 158 (1968) (conviction on nine counts required 2 1/2 years imprisonment before
insolvency oath could be invoked).
48. The disadvantages of short-term imprisonment are numerous: (I) the time limit makes
rehabilitative measures almost impossible; (2) the institutions are frequently crowded and
unsanitary; (3) ill-equipped defendants are exposed to contamination by other, more
experienced criminals; (4) the absence of the defendant may affect the economic status and
morale of his family and incur the permanent social stigma of the community; and (5) the
danger of recidivism may be increased by the difficulties the defendant will undergo when
seeking to readjust to the community after discharge. See Note, 101 U. PA. L. REV. supra note
16, at 1022.
49. United States v. Ridgewood Garment Co., 44 F. Supp. 435 (E.D.N.Y. 1942); Shoop
v. State, 209 Ark. 642, 192 S.W.2d 122 (1946); Ex parte Garrison, 193 Cal. 37, 223 P. 64
(1924); In re Sullivan, 3 Cal. App. 193, 84 P. 781 (1906); Mullin v. State ex rel. Williams, 38
Del. 533, 194 A. 578 (1937); Henderson v. United States, 189 A.2d 132 (D.C. App. 1963); Lee
v. State, 103 Ga. App. 161, 118 S.E.2d 599 (1961); Ex parte Converse, 45 Nev. 93, 198 P. 229
(1921); State ex rel. Lynch v. Johnson, 30 N.J. Super. 235, 104 A.2d 87 (1954); People ex rel.
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one the other should be imposedY' This latter view, however, is not
consistent with the current theories of criminal correction, because the
factors which determine that a fine should be imposed are
independent, indeed mutually exclusive, of those which determine that
imprisonment would be an appropriate sanction. Imprisonment to
enforce payment of a fine vitiates the initial decision to lunish by
fine. Avoidance of imprisonment is an important part of modern
sentencing policy, and failure to pay a fine should not lead routinely
to jailing 5 According to sound sentencing policy, the sanction to be
imposed should depend strictly upon the optimum corrective course as
determined diagnostically, rather than mechanically by statute. This
impropriety of imprisonment for nonpayment is particularly acute
when the court has no authority to impose a sentence of
imprisonment for the substantive offense, when the fine imposed is
beyond the defendant's ability to pay, or when the imprisonment
occurs for nonpayment of court costs.
The absence of authority to punish the substantive offense by
imprisonment is a clear statement of legislative policy that the
offender should not be removed from the community under any
circumstances. Default imprisonment represents another, more general
legislative policy, which if applied to the previous particular situation
creates irreconcilable conflict. -Because of the underlying policy that
default imprisonment is an enforcement device, the general policy of
default imprisonment should be subordinate to the more specific
statutes.
When a court imposes a fine known to be beyond the ability of
the defendant to pay, it has, effectively, imposed a sentence of
imprisonment after determining that the policy considerations called
for a financial sanction. The fine may thus become a guise for
imprisoning the poor whenever the sentencing judge believes that the
maximum term provided by statute is not sufficiently severe.5 2 A
defendant should not be sentenced to imprisonment simply because he
cannot pay a fine at the time of the judgment. The severity of the
Loos v. Redamn, 265 N.Y.S.2d 453 (Sup. Ct. 1965); McKinney v. Hamilton, 282 N.Y. 393, 26
N.E.2d 949 (1940); City of Buffalo v. Murphy, 228 App. Div. 279, 239 N.Y.S. 206 (1930);
Ex parte Arnett, 225 P.2d 381 (Okla. Crim. App. 1950); Ex parte Autry, 58 Okla. Cr. 88, 50
P.2d 239 (1935). But see Chapman v. Selover, 225 N.Y. 417, 122 N.E. 206 (1919); Dixon v. State,
2 Tex. 481 (1849).
50. See, e.g., Dixon v. State, 2 Tex. 481, 483 (1849).
51. See notes 7-11 supra and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 32 Misc. 319, 66 N.Y.S. 733 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
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punishment should be measured by its corrective value rather than by
reason of the defendant's wealth.
If court costs are considered a financial penalty, they are assessed
as an arbitrary addition to the punishment, without regard for those
penological principles of sentencing by which a fine, or other sanction,
should be imposed. Consequently, their amount is usually unrelated to
the ability of the defendant to pay or to the severity of the criminal
offense. Further, when accompanying a sentence of imprisonment, the
punitive effect of a financial assessment is extremely limited. 3 When
accompanying a fine, imprisonment for nonpayment of costs conflicts
with the policy implicit in the imposition of the fine. On the other
hand, if costs are not considered as punishment, that conclusion
operates to invoke the constitutional limitations of the thirteenth
amendment prohibiting involuntary servitude.54
Since modern penology favors individualized punishment, the
rules should allow a certain amount of discretion to distinguish
particular individuals. The policy of equality of treatment must be
carefully distinguished from an alleged right to identity of treatment. 5
No person should complain that he has not received a sentence
identical to one given another convicted of the same class of crime.
Nor should a person unable to pay any fine whatever be immune
from imprisonment if such a sanction is authorized by statute and no
other penalty is available. It is unlikely, however, that all unfavorable
discriminatory consequences of current sentencing procedure can be
eliminated when the only alternatives before the sentencing judge are
fine or imprisonment. Putting all offenders in jail would be as
unacceptable as would relieving those unable to pay a fine of all
penalties. There are methods, however, by which the legislatures and
the courts can apply principles of modern sentencing to insure a more
efficient use and enforcement of financial penalties. These alternatives
are discussed in the following section.
D. Alternatives to Imprisonment
Certainly, practical difficulties should be expected in determining
the offender's ability to pay a fine or costs. However, the use of
presentence reports containing information pertinent to an individual
53. See notes 7 & 16 supra.
54. For a discussion of the constitutional questions raised by this hypothesis, see notes 12239 infra and accompanying text.
55. See REP. ATT'Y GEN. COMM. ON POVERTY AND THE ADMIN. OF FED. CRINI. JUSTICE 910 (1963). See also Note, 81 HARV. L. REV., supra note 2, at 821-23.
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offender is already recognized as indispensible to a fair sentence 5 In
some states the court is required to make a presentence report 7 but
the usual practice leaves the use of such a report to the discretion of
the court." The Supreme Court has endorsed the liberal use of
presentence reports, and has suggested the broad potential for their
use 9
The presentence report may include information concerning the
economic status of the offender. Earnings can be checked reliably
through an employer, or by permitting disclosure to the court of the
defendant's tax returns. Alternatively, the burden can be placed on the
defendant to show cause why a financial penalty should not exceed a
certain amount, requiring him to file an affidavit listing his assets,
income, and obligations. Obviously, the filing of a false statement
under oath would subject the offender to penalties for contempt or
perjury.
1. Day-fines.-Assessment of fines according to the ability to
pay is not a new idea. Imposition of fines according to the
defendant's wealth was practiced in 13th century England, and
advocated throughout the 18th and 19th centuriesY0 When a laborer
had been fined the equivalent of three days wages, equity and
efficiency of sentencing procedure would require that a wealthy man
be fined three days income for the same offense.
In Finland and Sweden, a system for assessing fines according to
this theory has been establishedY' It sets up a system of "day-fines"
according to which a fine is expressed in abstract units, varying
between a minimum and maximum prescribed for the offense. This
preserves a distinction in punishment with respect to the nature of the
offense. The actual monetary value of the abstract unit is determined
by considering the wealth of the defendant, his daily income,
56. Boldt, supra note 5, at 4; Chandler, supra note 2, at 830-31. For a critical appraisal of
the use of presentence reports, see S. RUBIN, supra note 5, at 73-108; Keve, The Professional
Character of the Presentence Report, 26 FED. PROBATION 51 (June, 1962). See also Bach, The
Defendant's Right to Access to Presentence Reports, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 160 (1968); Note, 81
HARV. L. REV., supra note 2, at 835-41.
57. E.g., MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 95-2203 (1968); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-19-6
(1950).
58. E.g., LA. CODE CRIM. L. & PROC. ANN. art. 875 (1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-1723 (1964); VA. CODE ANN. § 53-278.1 (1967); cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.07(5) (1962).
59. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
60. Note, 101 U. PA. L. REV., supra note 16, at 1024.
61. Eriksson, Postwar Prison Reform in Sweden, 293 THE ANNALS 152, 153 (May 1954);
Note, 101 U. PA. L. REV., supra note 16, at 1024-25.
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productive capacity, and the number of his dependents. The fine is
computed by multiplying this unit by a factor of the defendant's
wealth. This system of fining at a rate of the defendant's daily
income, rather than by the arbitrary amounts customarily fixed in
criminal statutes, makes a much wider range of fines available. For
example, in Sweden fines may range from $0.97 to $6,984.00 for
62
identical offenses.
There are several advantages to a day-fine system. First, fines are
imposed more equitably. A court need not resort to a sentence of
imprisonment in lieu of a fine unless the former sanction is required
for correctional purposes. If a fine is determined to be the appropriate
penalty, the court will almost always be able to assess an equitable
penalty. Second, there is a greater probability of payment. This means
that the financial penalty will be more effective as a criminal sanction,
without incurring the dangers of default imprisonment. In Sweden, the
day-fine system is credited with reducing imprisonment for defaults
from 12,000 or 13,000 a year to a few hundred a year.3
2. Installment payment.-The day-fine system is not completely
satisfactory in the abstract, because it considers the economic status
of the defendant only at a single point in time-the date of sentencing.
Often, the defendant is unable to pay a sufficient amount to meet even
the minimum fine which the court considers an appropriate sanction,
or is unable to pay at all, but could, over an extended period of time,
make payments totalling a much larger sum. In many cases,
especially when a trial has been demanded, the defendant who is
unable to pay the costs of prosecution at the time of sentencing could
do so if he were given a period of time to collect the money. In these
situations, the law should allow a deferred system of payment. Several
states make express provisions for payment of fines by installments,
usually in connection with a period of probation 4 Other jurisdictions
have general provisions permitting the delay of payment. " One
commentator would frame the solution in terms of a criminal credit
62. Note, 101 U. PA. L. REv., supra note 16, at 1025.
63. Eriksson, supra note 61, at 152-53.
64. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1205; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-2239 (1967 Supp.); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 52, § 18 (1957); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, §§ I, IA (1968); N.Y. CODE
CRIM. PROC. § 470-d; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2947.11 (Baldwin 1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
61, §§ 953,955, 1052, 1082 (1964); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.92.070 (1961). The federal
government also permits delayed installment payment in connection with probation. See 18
U.S.C. § 3651 (1964).
65. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203.1; CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 54-119 (1968); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 27-2901 (1953); N.Y. CODE CRINI. PROC. § 470-d; OHIO REV, CODE ANN. § 2947.12
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administration which would "lend" the defendant the money for the
fines and costs and arrange for subsequent repayment. 6
The advaritages of the installment system are persuasive. First, it
avoids the evils of short-term imprisonment. Assuming that a
correctional institution is able to run an efficient correctional
program, the rehabilitative effects on a short-term prisoner are
negligible and may be outweighed by the unfavorable influences with
which the prisoner is confronted. Further, such rehabilitative
programs are rarely established in county jails or similar facilities
where most default- prisoners are likely to be incarcerated. Second,
installment payment plans implement the sentencing policy that the
defendant should be permitted to continue social contact with his
family and his community, while enforcement of the penal sanction is
secured. The evidence indicates that the rate of collection under an
installment payment system is significantly greater than in a system
without installment plans. In England, as a result of 1914 reforms
permitting delayed payments, imprisonment for default declined from
83,000 a year in 1909 to 2,600 in 1946.67 In West Virginia, at the
peak of the Depression, one court reported that only five per cent of
installment fines led to default 8 Third, installment payment seems to
have some reformative effect on the offender. Recidivism is notably
lower among cases where a fine is iniposed as a condition of
probation 9 Fourth, the costs of criminal administration could be
reduced. A decrease in the number of default imprisonments would
decrease the costs of prison maintenance. The state more likely would
be reimbursed for the costs of prosecution. Because the defendant is
permitted to remain in the community, welfare payments to the
offender's family may be avoided.70
(Baldwin 1964); S.C. CODE ANN. § 55-591 (1962); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-17 (1953); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 57.04 (Supp. 1968).

66. Note, Equal Protectionand the Indigent Defendant: Griffin and Its Progeny, 16 STAN.
L. REV. 394, 412-13 (1964).
67. See E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY, supra note 6, at 330; Craven, Criminal Justice in
England, 27 CAN. BAR REV. 1111, 1113-14 (1949); Miller, The Fine-Price Tag or
Rehabilitative Force, 2 NAT'L PROBATION & PAROLE Ass'N J. 377, 383 (1956). Installment fines
were authorized in Britain in 1873 but little use was made of them until they became mandatory
in 1914. Craven, supra, at 1113.
68. Note, 101 U. PA. L. REV., supra note 16, at 1023.
69. Barrett, The Role of Fines in the Administration of Criminal Justice in
Massachusetts. 48 MASs. L.Q. 435 (1963); Davidson, The Promiscuous Fine, 8 CRIM. L.Q. 74
(1965); Note, 101 U. PA. L. REV., supra note 16, at 1020.
70. By imprisoning for nonpayment of fines and costs, the state not only loses the money
which might otherwise be collected, but it must also bear the cost of committing the defaulter.
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When a defendant defaults in the payment of an installment, he
should not be committed to prison automatically, but should be
permitted to appear to show cause why he should not be confined. If
a defendant shows that default was not attributable to willful refusal
to obey the order of the court or to failure to make a good faith
effort to obtain funds, the court should be empowered to allow
additional time for payment, to reduce the fine, or to revoke the
unpaid portion of the fine.7
3. The realm of imprisonment.-As already indicated complete
abolition of the power of commitment is not desirable, because a
change of circumstances after the date of sentencing may require
reevaluation of the original sentence. This power should be used
sparingly, remembering that a civil remedy always would be available.
Subsequent imprisonment would be justified if a defendant becomes
totally unable to pay a fine, and the court believes that some
punishment beyond probation must be exacted. The term of
incarceration should be determined with regard for the same penal
policies appropriate to original sentencing. The length of commitment
of a wage-earning defendant should be related to the amount of the
original fine so as to reflect the current economic value of forfeiture
of a day's work for the particular offender. In no event should the
imprisonment exceed the maximum amount provided as punishment
for violation of the substantive criminal offense. Since court costs are
assessed without consideration of penal or punitive effect, if the
defendant becomes unable to pay them, the civil remedy should be
exclusive. The state has no interest in imposing imprisonment for
correctional purposes in that situation, and it is unlikely that it would
recover the costs assessed when the expenses of imprisonment or hard
labor generally are greater than the value of the labor received7
In 1960, the average cost per capita for daily maintenance of prisoners in local jails and prisons
was $2.83. REPORT OF THE WORK OF THE FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS 17 (1960). In Tennessee,
one study showed the per capita costs of imprisonment and the revenue credit obtained by prison
labor resulted in a net loss to the county of more than half a million dollars. Comment, Jail
Fees and Court Costs for the Indigent Defendant: An Examination of the Tennessee Procedure,

35 TENN. L. REV. 74, 89 (1967). In Maryland, per capita costs for prisoners are $1,681 each
year, ANN. REP. MD. DEP'T CORREC. 7 (1966), and in Massachusetts the annual per capita cost
is $2,686.54. ANN. REP. MASS. STATE COMM'N OF CORREC., Pub. Doc. No. 115 (1964). The
national average is around $2,000. THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 15 (1967). See generally
Alexander, Do Our PrisonsCost Too Much, 293 THE ANNALS 35 (May 1954).
71. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 302.2, 302.3 (1962).
72.

See note 26 supra.
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Since the ultimate function of default imprisonment remains the
enforcement of payment of the original fine, the state has an interest
in allowing a defaulting offender to continue to work at his
employment and secure the money to pay. Thus, if the offender is
imprisoned, he might still be afforded an opportunity to continue
working under a "work-release" program, now in operation in a
growing number of states. 73 Prison inmates could, upon proper
qualification for the program, be released to the community to pursue
a trade or other activity. The wages earned could be held by the
states, or directly applied to discharge the financial penalty. Such a
program might provide a useful alternative when a defendant willfully
refuses to pay his fine or when a defendant is unable to manage his
financial affairs.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

The previous discussion contrasted the use of imprisonment on
default of payment of fines and court costs with the goals of sound
sentencing policies and criminal correction. The remainder of this
inquiry is confined to an examination of the constitutional limitations
on the administration of criminal justice and the practice of default
imprisonment. This section also considers the extent to which policies
of sentencing and criminal correction are incorporated into principles
of constitutional protection, such as equal protection, involuntary
servitude, and due process of law. Appellate review of sentencing is
required to implement fully the conclusions inferred in this part, since
those-procedural safeguards provided at trial do not meet the needs of
a guilty defendant who is treated unfairly after he is convicted. The
extension of constitutional limitations to the post-conviction process is
needed not only because the sentencing process plays such an
important part in determining the futures of individuals convicted of
73.

Work release programs are in effect in more than one-third of the states. See ALASKA
CAL. PEN. CODE § 1208; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 6532-34 (Supp.
1966); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 945.091 (Supp. 1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-614 (Supp. 1967);
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 13-140 et seq. (Supp. 1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 356.26 (Supp. 1969);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 527 (Supp. 1968-69); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 700A (Supp.
1967); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1741 (Supp. 1968); MINN. STAT. § 241.26 (Supp. 1967); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 221.170 (1962); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-2216 (Special Supp. 1968); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 607:14-a (Supp. 1967); N.Y. CORREC. LAW §§ 150-60; N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 148-33.1 (Supp. 1967); S.C. CODE ANN. § 55-321.1 (Supp. 1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 41.1237 (Supp. 1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 207 (Supp. 1968). Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE
STAT.

§ 33.30.250 (1962);

§ 303.9 (1962). See generally Zalba.
DELIN.

506-20 (1967).

Work Release-A Two-Pronged Eflbrt, 13 CRIME &
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crime, but also because it determines the general effectiveness of the

criminal law to protect all of society from unlawful abuse.74
A.

Equal Protection

Few principles are more basic than that equal justice be accorded
to rich and poor alike, and significant efforts have been made to

eliminate the discriminatory treatment of indigent defendants75 in
criminal proceedings. In Griffin v. Illinois,76 the Supreme Court made

its first broad pronouncement on equality in the criminal process. The
Court held that an Illinois statute which conditioned appeal of a
criminal conviction on the purchase of a trial transcript violated the

equal protection clause of the Constitution. Although the statute was
not, on its face, unconstitutional, its practical effect was to deny the
right of appeal to those too poor to purchase a transcript. The
holding emphasized that when economic inequalities among the
criminally accused tend to influence the administration of criminal
law, the government is required to take affirmative action to minimize
the influence; it is as much a denial of equal protection to treat
unequals equally as to treat equals unequally under the law.77

74. For a discussion of appellate review of criminal sentences, see Mueller & Le Poole,
Appellate Review of Legal But Excessive Sentences: A ComparativeStudy, 21 VAND. L. REV.
411 (1968); Thomas, Appellate Review of Sentences and the Development oJ Sentencing Policy:
The English Experience, 20 ALA. L. REV. 193 (1968); Weigel, Appellate Revision of Sentences:
To Make the Punishment Fit the Crime, 20 STAN. L. REV. 405 (1968).
75. Although cases involving the right of the indigent at trial and on appeal often concern
those who are absolutely destitute, it should be remembered that problems of equal criminal
justice, especially in this delicate area of financial penalties, extend to the near poor and the
average wage earner as well. For purposes of this note, the term "indigent" refers to anyone
who is financially unable to employ to his advantage the institution or service under
consideration, and in lieu of a better word, those who are not indigent are described as wealthy
or affluent. Clearly, "poverty must be conceived as a relative concept. An impoverished accused
is not necessarily one totally devoid of means. A problem of poverty arises for the system of
criminal justice when at any stage of the proceedings lack of means in the accused substantially
inhibits or prevents the proper assertion of a right or a claim of right." REP. ATT'Y GEN.
CONMl'N ON POVERTY INTHE ADMIN. OF FED. CRIM. JUSTICE 8-9 (1963); cf. In re Patterson, 136
Colo. 401, 317 P.2d 1041 (1957); Loy v. State, 74 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1954); Lloyd v. Warden of
Md. Pen., 217 Md. 667, 143 A.2d 483 (1958). See generally Kasimer & Choper, The Right to
Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings and Legal Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. REV.
I, 17-33 (1963); Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counsel for Indigent Criminal Dejendants,
47 MINN. L. REV. 1054, 1073 n.ll0 (1962).
76. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
77. One recalls the admonition of Anatole France that -[t]he law, in its majestic equality,
forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal
bread." A. FRANCE, JOHN COURNOS, A MODERN PLUTARCH 27, quoted in Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12, 23 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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The Griffin rationale has been liberally applied to other aspects
of appeal,7 8 and has been logically extended to impose constitutional
limitations within the trial process itself. 9 What once was dictum is
now controlling in our judicial system: "There can be no equal justice
where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money
he has.""0 Although the United States Supreme Court has not yet
examined the possible extension of the Griffin trend to the postconviction stage of criminal proceedings,81 the high courts of New
York and the District of Columbia have recently ruled that default
imprisonment of indigent prisoners which exceeds the maximum term
which could be imposed as an original sentence violates the prisoner's
right to equal protection of the laws.
In People v. Saffore,82 the New York Court of Appeals faced the
case of an indigent prisoner convicted of assault and sentenced to a
term of one year imprisonment plus a 500 dollar fine-the maximum
penalty allowed by the state's statute. Unable to pay the fine, the
defendant was ordered committed to additional imprisonment of 500
days, one day for each dollar of the fine. The prevailing view in
previous cases involving similar sentences was to uphold the validity
of the imprisonment against either statutory or constitutional attack,8
although several lower courts in New York rejected that majority
position 4 In Saffore, the New York Court of Appeals invalidated the
default imprisonment, holding that "when payment of a fine is
impossible, imprisonment to work out the fine, if it results in a total
imprisonment of more than a year for a misdemeanor [the statutory
maximum] . . . violates the defendant's right to equal protection of
the law . . . ."8 The court's decision rested on two grounds. First,
since imprisonment for nonpayment of a fine was construed as a
78. E.g., Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963); Smith v. Bennet, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
79. E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
80. 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).

81.

In Winters v. Beck, 385 U.S. 907 (1966), the Court denied certiorari in a case

involving the right of counsel in misdemeanor offenses. Dissenting from the decision, Mr. Justice
Stewart said in part: "[Nlot surprisingly, the petitioner did not question the vagueness of the
charge against him or the validity of converting a sentence of 30 days into one of 91/2 months
solely because of his poverty." Id. at 907.
82. 18 N.Y.2d 101, 218 N.E.2d 686, 271 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1966).
83. United States ex rel.
Privitera v. Kross, 239 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); People ex
rel.
Loos v. Redman, 48 Misc. 2d 592, 265 N.Y.S.2d 453 (Sup. Ct. 1965); People ex rel. Price v.
Hayes, 151 App. Div. 561, 136 N.Y.S. 854 (1912).
84. People v. Johnson, 24 App. Div. 577, 262 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1965); People v. Collins,
47 Misc. 2d 210, 26 N.Y.S.2d 970 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
85. 18 N.Y.2d at 104, 218 N.E.2d at 688, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
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method of collection after a refusal to pay, the court held that the
statute did not permit imprisonment of a defendant who is financially
unable to pay. Secondly, applying Griffin, the court reasoned that a
defendant's lack of money should not extend the length of his
imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum term. If the statute
were interpreted to permit default imprisonment to extend this
maximum period, the man who could not pay his fine would be
treated unequally from a more affluent offender, since only the latter
would possess the power to shorten his imprisonment. The analogy to
Griffin should be apparent; although the "protection" against
incarceration afforded by the statutory fine is superficially nondiscriminatory, the indigent who is unable to buy his freedom actually
receives no protection at all.
A similar result was reached by the Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia in Sawyer v. District of Columbia." The
defendant was fined 150 dollars for jaywalking under a statute
providing for a penalty of 300 dollars, or ten days imprisonment, or
both; being unable to pay the fine, he was committed for 60 days.
Noting its prior warnings that alternative sentences and default
imprisonment could not be used as a guise for meting out longer
prison terms, 7 the court invalidated the sentence:
We hold this sentence invalid and are of the opinion that in every case in which
the defendant is indigent, a sentence of imprisonment in default of payment of a
fine which exceeds the maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed
under the substantive statute as an original sentence is an invalid exercise of the
court's discretion . . . .

The decision rested on grounds of statutory interpretation and
constitutionality: "The application of the statute to a person known
by the court to ble indigent . . .subverts the legitimate purpose of a
valid statute and it is clear that the statute, so applied, would then
present the grave constitutional questions argued here." 9 The court
noted that the only reason that the defendant was imprisoned beyond
the maximum period of ten days was because of his indigence and
found that such use of default imprisonment was inconsistent with its
purpose to coerce payment. The sentencing court's action was

86. 238 A.2d 314 (D.C. App. 1968).
87. Henderson v. United States, 189 A.2d 132 (D.C. App. 1963); Peeples v. District of
Columbia, 75 A.2d 845 (Mun. Ct. App. 1950).
88. Sawyer v. District of Columbia, 238 A.2d 314, 318 (D.C. App. 1968).
89. Id.
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interpreted as an attempt "to impose a longer term of punishment
than permitted by law." '
Whether costs of prosecution are considered a penalty or not, the
rules limiting imprisonment for nonpayment of fines are equally
applicable to assessment of costs, since the subsequent default
imprisonment remains a coercive device. Arguments can also be raised
against imprisonment for certain specific items of costs. For example,
a state which assigns as costs of the prosecution attorney fees of the
lawyer furnished to an indigent defendant cannot imprison on default
of payment.91 If the defendant had retained counsel, commitment for
nonpayment of fees would have been prohibited as imprisonment for
debt. Yet if the defendant declines the assistance of counsel in fear of
additional imprisonment, his right to counsel becomes illusory, and
this promotes invidious discrimination between rich and poor,
especially when counsel was assigned because the defendant could not
afford his own attorney. This problem applies also to assessment of
jury fees, jury mileage, bailiff fees, meals, lodging, professional
services rendered by physicians and other expert witnesses, and similar
expenses.92
Costs which the indigent incurs before and during trial as a
consequence of his incarceration and inability to post bail are also
obviously the result of his economic status. Although the state may
distinguish between criminal defendants by freeing those who supply
bail pending trial and confining those who do not,93 it may not use
this period of confinement to impose any additional inequality of
treatment beyond that which is inherent in the confinement itself. For
example, a defendant unable to furnish bail is not requited to stand in
a police line-up 4 Similarly, imprisonment for nonpayment of costs
which accrue because a defendant can not make bail discriminates
against the indigent, and has been held constitutionally impermissible:
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Exparle Wilson, 89 Ohio L. Abs. 575, 183 N.E.2d 625 (1962).
Gleckman v. United States, 80 F.2d 394 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 709 (1935);

United States v. Wilson, 193 F. 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
93. But see Bandy v. United States, 82 S. Ct. II (Douglas, Cir. J. 1961) (dictum), Bandy
v. United States, 81 S.Ct. 197 (Douglas, Cir. J. 1960) (dictum). The right to bail is discussed
exhaustively in Foote, The Coming ConstitutionalCrisis in Bail: I & II,113 U. PA. L. REV. 959,

1125 (1965).
94. Butler v. Crumlish, 229 F. Supp. 565 (E.D. Pa. 1964). "The theoretical equality ...
when all are not financially equal thus has become in reality a deep and wounding social inequality,
increasingly oppressive to the poor and the vagrant. It brings to mind Anatole France's ironic
epigram that the law in its majestic impartiality forbids the rich and poor alike to sleep under

bridges." Id. at 568.
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[S]tatutes requiring an indigent defendant to remain in jail beyond his term to

work out costs incurred as jail fees awaiting trial do operate to discriminate
against the defendant due to his poverty, and are in conflict with the . . . [equal
protection clause] of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States. It would not be incurred by a defendant able to make bond, and,
in fact, would not be costs incurred by rich and poor alike. 5

The Saffore-Sawyer decisions were limited to cases in which
default imprisonment exceeded the statutory maximum sentence, and
subsequent decisions have refused to extend the holding to default
imprisonment less than that maximum. 6 The argument is that a
defendant's rights regarding default imprisonment are no greater than
those rights applicable to the original sentence; a defendant sentenced
to a non-maximum term of imprisonment for default is in no worse
position than if he were originally imprisoned for the same period of
time. If, however, the functional distinction between original
imprisonment and default imprisonment is maintained," the SafforeSawyer reasoning would not be limited to default imprisonment which
exceeds statutory maximums. Imposition of a fine, which reflects a
statutory or penological policy determination that the offender should
not be isolated from his community, enables the offender to buy his
freedom by tender of payment. But a fine assessed above the
defendant's ability to pay denies this opportunity to obtain freedom; it
is, in effect, imprisonment for being poor 8 Thus, to provide truly
equal protection of the laws, reasonable alternatives to imprisonment,
such as delayed payment, installment payment or conditional
probation, must be available to the less affluent offender to serve the
same "opting out" function that fines afford the offender who can
pay his fine.
When default imprisonment is used to coerce payment from those
who can afford to pay, or when no other alternative would satisfy the
penal or correctional goal desired, every attempt should be made to
impose only that degree of imprisonment which most closely
approximates the punitive effect of the financial penalty9 The
95. State ex rel. Hawkins v. Luttrel, 221 Tenn. 32, 35-36, 424 S.W.2d 189, 191 (1968);
accord. Dillehay v. White, 264 F. Supp. 164 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
96. People v. Gittelson, 25 App. Div. 265, 268 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1966); People ex rel.
Eisenstadt v.Thomas, 51 Misc. 2d 627, 273 N.Y.S.2d 638 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
97. q. Wildeblood v. United States, 284 F.2d 592, 597-98 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Hart v. Norman, 92 Misc. 185, 155 N.Y.S. 238 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
98. See GoldIerg, Equality and Governnental Action, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 205 (1964);
Greenawalt, 1966 Survey of New York Law: Constitutional Law, 18 SYRACUSE L. REv. 180
(1967); Note, Equal Protection and the Indigent Defendant: Griffin and Its Progeny, 16 STAN.
L. REv. 394 (1964).

99. See Greenawalt, supra note 98, at 197.
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conversion ratio for default imprisonment would have to be revised to
reflect the minimum econormlic value of a day's labor. Although no
precise equation of fines and imprisonment is possible, an offender
could be imprisoned no longer than would be necessary to persuade
an affluent person to pay the minimum fine which the court deems an
adequate penal sanction and to avoid the imprisonment. When the
marginal value of the imprisonment exceeds this "point of
persuasion," the affluent pays the fine and avoids imprisonment, but
the indigent has no choice but to remain incarcerated. Even if a
longer term of imprisonment might otherwise have been imposed as
punishment for the substantive offense, an indigent's freedom would
not be valued equal to that of the wealthy, unless he receives the fair
worth, by modern economic standards, of the loss of his freedom.'"
Opponents of the extension of the Griffin rationale deny that a
prisoner is entitled to constitutional protection at the sentencing stage.
The argument proposes that all offenders must be punished, and an
indigent who is not imprisoned for default will be invited to violate
the law with impunity. 01 1 This position seems to confuse identity of
sanction with equality of treatment, ignoring that the primary purpose
of the default imprisonment is to coerce payment. Further, it is
unrealistic to assume a defendant has not been punished, especially
when he has served the statutory maximum imprisonment for the
offense. Opponents also argue that if indigents are excused from
imprisonment, then those wealthy enough to pay fines and costs will
be denied equal protection of the law. 12 This overlooks the fact that
groups can be treated differently if there is a basis for reasonable
classifications. For example, the state must provide only the indigent
with free counsel to assist him, and only the indigent must be given a
free transcript on appeal. Similarly, the indigent sentenced to pay a
fine or costs beyond his ability to pay is forced by the action of the
state, whether he desires to pay or not, to serve a term of
imprisonment which the wealthy person has the option to avoid. The
100. Compare the language of Mr. Justice Black in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19
(1956) (cited in text accompanying note 80 supra), with Wildeblood v. United States, 284 F.2d
592; 593 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Edgerton, C.J. dissenting): "Few would care to say there can be equal
justice where the kind of punishment a man gets depends on the amount of noney he has." Id.
at 594.
101. Cf State ex rel. Dillehay v. White, 217 Tenn. 524, 398 S.W.2d 737 (1966); United
States ex rel. Privitera v. Kross, 239 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See also Note, The Equal
Protection Clause and Imprisonment of Indigents Jbr Non-payment of Fines, 64 MICH. L.
REV. 938, 943 n.35 (1966); Note, 16 STAN. L. REV., supra note 66, at 412-13.
102. State ex rel. Dillehay v. White, 217 Tenn. 524, 531-32, 398 S.W.2d 737, 740 (1966).
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difference in economic status makes the default imprisonment of a
wealthy person a reasonable exercise of the power to coerce

payment,'03 while applied to the indigent, it only serves to increase the
term of commitment above the legal amount-the coersive aspect is

meaningless. Finally, opponents argue that extension of rights to the
indigent creates a severe financial burden to the states.

4

However, in

cases involving imprisonment for nonpayment of fines and costs, these
objections do not apply. The state would actually reduce expenditures
by decreasing the instances of default imprisonment.'
In summary, the equal protection clause suggests several

restrictions on imprisonment for nonpayment. First, the total
imprisonment may never exceed the maximum provided for the
statutory offense. Second, imprisonment for less than the maximum
amount must be computed as a reasonable equivalent to payment of
the fine. Third, the defendant may never be imprisoned for
nonpayment of any costs accrued as a result of his indigence.
B.

The Eighth Amendment: Excessive Fines and Cruel and Unusual
Punishment

The eighth amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
prohibiting the imposition of excessive fines and cruel and unusual
punishment, 6 has been made applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment."0 In addition, each state constitution includes

equivalent guarantees.0 8 The meaning of these protections has been
difficult to determine, although it certainly includes "unnecessary

cruelty" and anything "unhuman or barbarous."' 09 It has been
103. Since those imprisoned who can pay their fines and costs have the "keys to their
cells," they cannot complain that they are given insufficient credit against their fines and costs
for the days spent in jail. Greenawalt, supra note 98, at 196-97.
104. E.g., Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 509 (1963) (White, J. dissenting); Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 34 (1956) (Harlan, J. dissenting).
105. See note 70 supra.
106. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. Vill.
107. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); cf. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514
(1968) (chronic alcoholic). The source of the eighth amendment is found in the English Bill of
Rights of 1688: -[E]xcessive fines have been imposed; and illegal and cruel punishments
inflicted. . . . [E]xcessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted." I Will. & Mary, Sess. 2, ch. 2 (1688).
108. See LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING RESEARCH FUND, INDEX DIGEST OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONS

342-43 (2d ed. 1959, Supp. 1965).

109. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 13536 (1879).
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interpreted to refer to the type or character of the punishment rather

than to its severity; if a sentence imposed a penalty within the
maximum fixed by the legislature, it has been held that no cruel and
unusual punishment can result."" The eighth amendment does not
merely prohibit cruel and unusual punishment as it was known in
1789, however, but acquires a wider meaning as public opinion
changes; a punishment may become cruel as public sentiment begins
to condemn it."' The basic concept is measured by the limits of

current civilized standards: "The amendment must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a

maturing society.' '112
When a sentence has included a fine, or a fine and imprisonment,
most authority has rejected assertions that imprisonment for

nonpayment was cruel and unusual punishment, even if the statutory
maximum for the substantive offense had been exceeded." 3 The
decisions have also refused to consider the defendant's ability to pay a
fine in determining whether the sentence was excessive or cruel and
unusual punishment." 4 For example, when a defendant was convicted

of the unlawful practice of medicine, a lower New York court held:
110. United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 603-09 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
838 (1952); People v. Calcaterra, 33 Ill. 2d 541, 213 N.E.2d 270 (1965); Duff v. State, 229 Md.
126, 182 A.2d 349 (1962); Barber v. Gladden, 210 Ore. 46, 309 P.2d 192 (1957), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 948 (1959). Contra, O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 366 (1892) (Harlan & Brewer,
JJ. dissenting). But cf State v. Starlight Club, 17 Utah 2d 174, 406 P.2d 912 (1965), where fines
above $2500 were set aside as excessive in case when maximum fine of $2500 and liquor charter
revocation could have been imposed on single liquor violation, but plainclothes police procurred
multiple violations by continuing to order rounds of drinks. See also Townsend v. Burke, 334
U.S. 736, 741 (1948). See generally Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); State v. Staub,
182 La. 1040, 162 So. 766 (1935); Mitchell v. State, 82 Md. 527, 34 A. 246 (1896).
I11. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); State v. Staub, 182 La. 1040, 162 So.
766 (1935).
112. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1962) (divestiture of citizenship violates eighth
amendment); see Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); cf. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514
(1968).
113. People v. Magoni, 73 Cal. App. 78, 238 P. 112 (1925); Henderson v. United States,
189 A.2d 132 (D.C. App. 1963); Adjni v. State, 139 So. 2d 179 (D. Ct. App. Fla. 1962); Lee v.
State, 103 Ga. App. 161, 118 S.E.2d 599 (1961); Berkenfield v. People, 191 I1. 272, 61 N.E. 96
(1901); State v. Peterson, 38 Minn. 143, 36 N.W. 443 (1888); People ex rel. Crockett v.
Redman, 41 Misc. 2d 962, 246 N.Y.S.2d 861 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Exparte Converse, 45 Nev. 93,
198 P. 229 (1921); Foertsch v. Jameson, 48 S.D. 328, 204 N.W. 175 (1925); State v. Tullock,
118 Wash. 496, 203 P. 932 (1922).
114. Exparte Watkins, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 568 (1833); Burlington C.R. & N. Ry. v. Dey, 82
Iowa 312, 48 N.W. 98 (1891); Foertsch v. Jameson, 48 S.D. 328, 204 N.W. 175 (1925). But see
Exparte Tuieher, 69 Iowa 393, 396, 28 N.W. 655, 656 (1886): "It is true that the imprisonment is
but a mode of enforcing the payment of the fine and costs; but if the convicted person is unable to
pay, then the imprisonment becomes punishment, and possibly within the prohibition of section
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The fine imposed on the defendant was reasonable penalty authorized by statute.
Inability to pay such a reasonable fine does not render the fine unreasonable or
excessive . . . nor is the method of enforcing the fine in default of payment
improper, as this method is expressly provided for by statute. . . . In providing

that a judgment that defendant pay a fine may also direct that he be imprisoned
in default of payment for an additional period of confinement, this statute
discloses the legislative intent that inability to pay a fine should not constitute a
legal objection to a fine, and that the State should not be relegated to the
dubious remedy of a civil action for a penalty to enforce a fine.25

The majority conclusion has not passed unchallenged. A few
early cases determined that when a sentence included a term of
imprisonment plus a fine, imprisonment for nonpayment of the fine
was invalid abuse of the court's power:
When the legislature enacted these provisions of the statute providing for the
punishment of an offense by fine or imprisonment or both, it was not
contemplated that, when a punishment by imprisonment was imposed, thereafter
another should be added because the fine was not paid. The degradation and
punishment by imprisonment are greater than that by fine. Such a judgment

would be excessive, in that it would impose imprisonment for the nonpayment of
a debt or fine due the state after the right to punish by imprisonment had been

exhausted. In such a case the state must resort to its execution for the collection
of its fine, as in a case at law." 6

The trend of authority is returning to this position, and the ability to
pay a fine is being considered as grounds for invalidating a fine or the
resulting default imprisonment as "excessive" or "cruel and unusual
punishment." ' When imprisonment exceeds the statutory maximum,
it produces an additional term of incarceration where the legislature
intended nothing more severe than a pecuniary fine. In this sense, the
severity of the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. The excessive
nature of any term of imprisonment for default of payment of fines
and costs is keynoted by the present low conversion ratios by which
financial liability must be converted into imprisonment. "' It has been
suggested that constitutional limitations extend to any imprisonment
for nonpayment when the conversion ratio does not measure up to
acceptable economic standards, whether or not the sentence exceeds
17 of article I of the Constitution, which provides that cruel and unusual punishment shall not
be inflicted."
115. People v. Watson, 204 Misc. 467, 126 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
116. Roberts v. Howells, 22 Utah 289, 62 P. 892 (1900); accord, People v. Brown, 113
Cal. 35, 45 P. 181 (1896); People v. Kerr, 75 Cal. App. 273, 114 P. 584 (1911); People v.
Velarde, 45 Cal. App. 520, 188 P. 59 (1920).
117. But see State v. Hampton, 209 So. 2d 889 (Miss. 1968).
118. See People v. Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 218 N.E.2d 686, 271 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1966); cJ.
United Sates v. Doe, 101 F. Supp. 609, 613 n.6 (D. Conn. 1951).
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the statutory maximum, if payment is required immediately upon
sentencing." 9
In People v. McMillian,
'2
the defendant was convicted of petty
larceny and fined 150 dollars. Because he was indigent and could not
pay, the fine was converted at the rate of one day per dollar to 150
days imprisonment. The court invalidated the sentence and ordered
the prisoner released, having found that if a fine was the appropriate
punishment for the offense, then a sentence of five months in jail for
inability to pay was excessive and illegal. The court noted that the
statutory conversion ratio of one day per dollar dated back to 1876 and
remitted the fine to an amount equal to the time already served. This
disposition seems to suggest that the court did not reject default
imprisonment absolutely, but only as far as the equation of fine and
imprisonment was excessive according to modern economic standards.
This decision represents a return to the penological conclusion that
"what constitutes an excessive fine depends in part upon the nature
and character of the offense committed and in part upon the ability of
the defendant to pay. A fine which in one case would be only small
punishment, because easily paid, might in another case be excessive,
because its payment would be ruinous to the convict. 12 ' The decision
brings the constitutional standards into closer harmony with modern
criminal correctional theory.
C. Involuntary Servitude
The thirteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States reads:
§ I. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
§2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.' m

Although the amendment was obviously directed at the abolition of
slavery following the Civil War, this was not its sole purpose; it was
declared to encompass all the badges and incidents of slavery, and to
embrace all classes of persons.Iu Pursuant to section two, Congress
119. See generally Greenawalt, supra note 98.
120. 53 Misc. 685, 279 N.Y.S.2d 941 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
121. State v. Staub, 182 La. 1040, 162 So. 766 (1935); accord, Cohen v. State, 173 Md.
216, 195 A. 532 (1936); cl' ExparieTuicher,69 Iowa 393, 28 N.W. 655 (1886).
122. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (emphasis added).
123. Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Pollack v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4
(1944); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911); Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
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enacted the Anti-Peonage Act of 1867124 later revised in 1948. 'z This

legislation was designed to secure freedom and mobility in the labor
market and to prevent forced labor in the United States, except as a

means to punish crime.

2

Thus, the question is posed: whether

imprisonment for nonpayment of fines and costs can be included

within the meaning of punishment for crime.
A fine is certainly punishment for crime within the meaning of
the thirteenth amendment, but default imprisonment may be regarded

as a coercive device used to enforce payment of the fine. In the early
case of City of Topeka v. -Boutwell,'27the Supreme Court of Kansas

held that hard labor imposed on the defendant to work off a fine
levied for violation of a municipal ordinance was only a means of
collecting the fine, and was therefore in violation of the prohibition
against involuntary servitude. The weight of authority, however, has
been to the contrary,"" and the Supreme Court of the United States

has said in dictum that the state may impose fines and penalties
which must be worked out for the benefit of the state.2 9 Certainly,

imprisonment resulting from the refusal of a defendant to pay a fine
within his capacity to pay is closely related to the original
punishment. It is the consequence which the law attached to refusal to

pay. In the case of the indigent defendant who cannot pay, this
consequence is automatic. The nexus between a fine and default

imprisonment is sufficient to describe its use as punishment for the
crime, even though technically an enforcement device.

A few authorities also consider the assessment of court costs as
124. 14 Stat. 546 (1867).
125. 62 Stat. 772-73 (1948), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581-88 (1964). Peonage is defined as the
holding of one person against his will for the purpose of discharging a real or alleged
indebtedness. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911); Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671 (M.D. Ala.
1903); United States v. McClellan, 127 F. 971 (S.D. Ga. 1904); cji United States v. Shackney, 333
F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964). See generally Shapiro, Involuntary Servitude: The Need for a More
Flexible Approach, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 65 (1964).
126. "The undoubted aim of the thirteenth Amendment as implemented by the AntiPeonage Act was not merely to end slavery but to maintain a system of completly free and
voluntary labor throughout the United States. . . . [W]hatever of social value there may be, and
of course, it is great, in enforcing contracts and collection of debts, Congress has put it beyond
debate that no indebtedness warrants a suspension of the right to be free from compulsory
service." Pollack v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17-18 (1944).
127. 53 Kan. 20, 35 P. 819 (1894).
128. Goode v. Nelson, 73 Fla. 29, 74 So. 17 (1917); City of Chicago v. Kunowski, 308 Ill.
206, 139 N.E. 28 (1923); State v. McGuire, 152 La. 953, 94 So. 896 (1922); Exparte Hollman,
79 S.C. 9, 60 S.E. 19 (1908); City of Milwaukee v. Horvath, 31 Wis. 2d 490, 143 N.W.2d 446
(1966).
129. United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 149 (1914).
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part of the punishment for the substantive criminal offense, in the
nature of a fine, 3 ° Most authorities, however, treat costs as a debt
imposed upon the defendant, rather than upon the state, for policy
reasons that an offender should be required to reimburse the public
treasury for the expense of prosecuting him for his own wrongdoing. 3'
According to statutory interpretation and penological policy, costs are
not punishment for crime, and as such, it is constitutionally
impermissible to impose involuntary servitude by way of default
imprisonment to secure their collection.
The language of many statutes implies that legislative policy does
not regard criminal costs as part of the punishment. For example, the
statutes often distinguish the period of imprisonment for
"punishment" from the period of default imprisonment. Also, default
imprisonment statutes are normally not found in the section of state
codes dealing with criminal offenses, but rather are usually topically
located with statutes concerning prisons, or criminal procedure.
Judicial interpretation of the nature of criminal costs suggests a
similar conclusion. For example, a general pardon of a person
convicted of crime would not discharge him from liability for the
costs of prosecution. 132 Where the defendant is executed for the crime
of murder, his estate would still be liable for the costs of
prosecution. 3 3 Unlike a fine, the state cannot remit the costs, and
where the jury fixed the sentence they may not be instructed or
permitted to modify the amount of the costs. 134 Penological policy
would also distinguish the extra-punitive nature of court costs, since
costs are assessed automatically without regard for those principles of
sentencing by which penology requires a fine, or other sanction, to be
determined.
In Wright v. Matthews,' 31 the Virginia Supreme Court of
130. E.g., State ex rel.
Hopkins v. Justices of Buchanan County Ct., 41 Mo. 254 (1867);
State v. Kilmer, 31 N.D. 442, 153 N.W. 1089 (1915); Galcatcher v. Page, 437 P.2d 284 (Okla.
Crim. 1968). See W. 'VA. CODE ANN. § 62-5-7 (1966).
131. In re Boyd, 34 Kan. 57, 9 P. 240 (1886); Kincaid v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 341,
105 S.E.2d 846 (1958); cf. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 280, § 6 (1968); "Costs shall not be imposed
by the court or justice as a penalty or part penalty for a crime."
132. Edwards v. State, 12 Ark. 122 (1851); In re Boyd, 34 Kan. 57, 9 P. 240 (1886); State
v. McO'Blenis, 21 Mo. 272 (1855); Playford v. Commonwealth, 4 Pa. 144 (1846); Anglea v.
Commonwealth, 51 Va. (10 Gratt.) 696 (1853).
133. Commonwealth v. McCue's Ex'rs, 109 Va. 302, 63 S.E. 1066 (1909).
134. Wilson v. Sloan, 438 S.W.2d 75 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1968); Brief for Petitioner, at II.
But see IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1825 (1956).
135. 209 Va. 246, 163 S.E.2d 158 (1968).
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Appeals was presented with this very constitutional question. The
petitioner was sentenced to a nine month term of imprisonment for
burglary and "to serve such [further] time as may be required to pay
the costs herein [$1,064.75] unless said costs are sooner paid."',"
"[S]uch costs" amounted to two and a half years at hard labor in the
state labor farm, the costs being discharged at a rate of seventy-five
cents per day. Reversing the decision below, the court granted the
petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that assessment of the
costs of prosecution were not part of the petitioner's punishment, and
that, therefore, his imprisonment for nonpayment of those costs
3 7
contravened the thirteenth amendment.
Although the petitioner in Wright was indigent, the court's
reasoning applies to all persons, regardless of economic status.
Default imprisonment is strictly a remedial action which serves the
purpose of collecting a debt owed to the state which a defendant
refuses to pay. It is not intended as a deterrent to offenses against the
public, but is in the nature of a civil contempt proceeding.'30 When the
state has other adequate means available to collect the amount due,
such as the civil remedy of levy and execution' 39 it is not entitled
to resort to imprisonment to collect its debt.
D.

ImprisonmentJbr Debt

Although the Federal Constitution has not been interpreted as
prohibiting imprisonment for debt, the thirteenth amendment and the
Anti-Peonage legislation may be construed to indicate this conclusion,
at least to the extent of contractual debts, such as labor contracts.
Certainly, the broad powers granted by the implementation clause of
the amendment would enable Congress to enact such a prohibition.
Nevertheless, imprisonment for debt is currently a state constitutional
136. Wright v. Matthews, 209 Va. 246, 163 S.E.2d 158, 159 (1968).
137. The court's theory is now being tested in the federal courts. See Morris v.
Schoonfield, 4 CRI,. L. REP. 2398 (D. Md. Jan. 29, 1969); Anderson v. Ellington, Civil
Action No. 5344 (M.D. Tenn., March 7, 1969). The Wright decision did not discuss whether

mere imprisonment without labor would contravene the thirteenth amendment, but the
amendment is probably broad enough to include that possibility. See Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409 (1968). But see City of Milwaukee v. Horvath, 31 Wis. 2d 490, 143 N.W.2d 466
(1966).
138. For a discussion of civil and criminal contempt, see Fenton v. Walling, 139 F.2d 608
(9th Cir. 1943); Staley v. South Jersey Realty Co., 83 N.J. Eq. 300, 90 A. 1042 (1914). Of
course, when the defendant is indigent, the contempt concept is meaningless; in that case, he
does not refuse to pay, but simply is unable to do so.
139. See note 19 supra.
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question. 4 " Most authority does not regard imprisonment for
nonpayment of fines and costs to be imprisonment for debt, drawing
a distinction between the public and the private creditor.' Two state
constitutions make specific exception from the prohibition of
imprisonment for debt for "fines and penalties imposed by law,"
recognizing sub silentio that fines are really debts.1 2 The state
limitations are usually concerned with imprisonment for a contractual
debt, and often except from limitation the imprisonment for debts
arising from tort claims.4 3 In the context of fines and costs, except
when imprisonment is required as a punishment for crime, a state has
no special right to obtain forced labor or imprisonment for debt.
Reasonable existing alternatives to imprisonment which promise to
produce the desired penal treatment and also make possible payment
of the defendant's debt have already been discussed, and no
legitimate public interest can be served by imprisoning the defendant
instead. Since state statutes provide that judgments for fines and costs
are liens on the defendant's property, since default imprisonment
should be interpreted as an enforcement device rather than as
punishment, and since these assessments resemble a "quasicontractual" debt owed by the defendant to the state, the state may
not escape the proscription of imprisonment for debt which limits the
rights of all other private creditors.
E. Due Process
The relationship between society and the individual is probably
never so crucial as in the sentencing of criminal offenders, which
determines both the futures of convicted individuals and the
effectiveness of criminal law administration to deal with society's
140. For an index to state constitutional provisions dealing with imprisonment for debt,
see LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING RESEARCH COUNCIL, INDEX DIGEST OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 351 (2d
ed. 1959, Supp. 1964). See generally Ford, Inprisonment for Debt, 25 MICH. L. REV. 24 (1926);
Freedman, Imprisonmentfor Debt, 2 TEMP. L.Q. 330 (1927); Note, Present Status of Execution
Against the Body of the Judgment Debtor, 42 IOWA L. REV. 306 (1957).
141. See. e.g., Freeman v. United States, 217 U.S. 539 (1910); Lee v. State, 75 Ala. 29
(1883); Ex parte Small, 92 Okla. Crim. 101, 122 P.2d 669 (1950); Harlow v. Clow, 110 Ore.
257, 223 P. 541 (1924); Williams v. State, 155 Tenn. 364, 293 S.W. 757 (1927); Dixon v. State,
2 Tex. 481 (1847); Colby v. Backus, 19 Wash. 347, 53 P. 367 (1898). But see Ex parte
Russellville, 95 Ala. 19, II So. 18 (1891); Hubbell v. Higgins, 148 Iowa 36, 126 N.W. 914
(1910); Risser v. Hoyt, 53 Mich. 185, 18 N.W. 611 (1884); Ex parte Crenshaw, 80 Mo. 447
(1883).
142. Mo. CONST. art. I, § II; OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 13.
143. Compare CAL. CONST. art I, § 15, with N.J. CONST. art. I, § 13.
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offenders. Despite its importance, trial courts have exercised
unreviewable discretion over the sentencing process which is without
comparison in our judicial system, and courts have refused to examine
the sentencing function of the lower courts against the procedural and
substantive restrictions on the deprivation of liberty and property
without due process of law.1 4 4 It is not surprising that the
discretionary powers in the lower courts give rise to great disparity of
sentencing practices; the intended purpose of individualization of
treatment is to permit a wide range of dispositions for similar
offenses. But when the disparity becomes prejudicial to the
rehabilitation of offenders and to the reduction of recidivism, it begins
to restrict the vitality of the correctional system itself. The protections
against judicial abuse afforded defendants before they are found guilty
should apply after they are convicted as safeguards in the assessment
of penalty. Legislative supervision and judicial review of the
sentencing procedure is needed to balance the powers of discretion and
the requirements of both substantive and procedural due process. The
present discussion, however, is limited to questions of substantive due
process and default imprisonment.
Imprisonment for a term computed on the basis of a day for
each dollar of an unpaid fine offends basic notions of justice. By this
sum, or one similar, a day of liberty is valued for default
imprisonment purposes. Since the penological purpose of such
imprisonment is to allow the state to collect in labor that which it
cannot collect in money, it would seem that the statutory conversion
ratios must approximate modern labor market conditions. When the
use of delayed payment, installment plans or other alternatives
promise to satisfy the correctional functions of a financial penalty, it
becomes fundamentally unfair for the state to force menial labor at
low wages upon an offender in the guise of proper administration of
the criminal law. For example, costs are assessed without regard for
the character of the offense or the offender; they lack any rational
relationship to the severity of the crime or to the defendant's ability
to pay.4 5 When nonpayment of costs results in imprisonment that
serves no correctional function, it actually impairs rehabilitation and
144.
145.

For discussion of the procedural due process question, see articles cited supra note 2.
E.g.. Wilson v. Sloan, 438 S.W.2d 75 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1968) (original six months

imprisonment plus cost of $71.80 resulting in additional imprisonment in workhouse of two
months); Wright v. Matthews, 209 Va. 246, 163 S.E.2d 158 (1968) (original sentence of nine
months plus additional imprisonment of two and one half years for nonpayment of $1,064.75 costs,
including attorney fees); State v. Alexander, 78 Wyo. 324, 324 P.2d 831 (1958) (original sentence
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promotes recidivism. The constitutional protection of due process of
law clearly pre-empts a state's interest in obtaining "reimbursement"
for the costs of prosecuting a criminal offender at the expense of the
proper administration of criminal justice.
Imprisonment for nonpayment of costs may also deny due
process by interfering with the exercise of other constitutional rights.
For example, imprisonment is improper when a defendant fails to pay
a fine assessed following conviction for a misdemeanor."' Since the
defendant in a misdemeanor prosecution may be denied counsel, it is
unfair to imprison a convicted defendant who might not have been
able to defend himself without counsel. If counsel is denied on -the
distinction between felony and misdemeanor, only the latter being
punishable by imprisonment, then default imprisonment cannot be
used to obliterate the distinction once a misdemeanant is convicted.
Similarly, an imprisonment for nonpayment of costs may interfere
with the right to trial,'147 since a defendant who chooses to exercise his
right to trial is threatened with large costs which could be avoided if,
instead, the accused settled the case with the prosecutor.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The use of imprisonment to enforce the collection of fines and
costs is an unfortunate remnant of a time when penal theory and
constitutional interpretation lacked their present sophistication. Its
mechanical and indiscriminate use today interferes with the proper
administration of criminal correction-a highly complicated process
of individualized treatment of offenders-and denies protections
afforded by the Constitution of the United States. This note has
examined the restrictions which might be applied to the postconviction sentencing procedure of default imprisonment, as derived
from the relevant concepts of legislative, judicial, constitutional, and
penological policy. To the extent that the Constitution affords
protection, the judicial branch has power to define the applicable
rules. Beyond that which the Constitution requires, both the courts
and the legislatures must be inspired to establish sentencing guidelines
which implement the policies of modern sentencing. Except to the
of 45 to 65 years plus $6,435 costs resulting in additional 18 years imprisonment); Arnold v.
State, 76 Wyo. 408, 306 P.2d 368 (1957) (original sentence of six months imprisonment and $100
fine with $900 costs resulting in two and a half years additional imprisonment figured at the rate of
a dollar a day).
146. State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 154 N.W.2d 888 (1968).
147. Wilson v. Sloan, 438 S.W.2d 75 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1968), Brief for Petitioner, at 9.
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extent necessary for its use as a penal sanction, imprisonment for
nonpayment of fines and costs should be abolished from the criminal
system. Whenever imprisonment is imposed, it must be justified as
appropriate punishment for the offender and for the offense. Default
imprisonment should not be used at the convenience of the state
simply to avoid pursuing civil remedies, to excuse the correctional
system from administering alternative payment plans, or to excuse the
judicial system from fully considering all factors relevant to the
determination of criminal sentences.
PAUL M. STEIN

